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Current Issues in the Law of
Discrimination and Miners' Rights
Under the Federal Mine Safety &
Health Act of 1977
By THOMAS C. MEANS, ESQ.*
INTRODUCTION
The mining industry is subject to a unique set of labor law
requirements. Not only are miners protected by the gamut of
anti-discrimination1 and labor2 laws which protect most other
workers, but they are also the beneficiaries of a broad array of
additional rights under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977 (Act or Mine Act).3
Section 105(c) 4 of the Act sets forth both the substantive and
procedural components of the Act's anti-discrimination provi-
* A.B. 1969 Dartmouth College; M.P.A. 1975 (Master of Public Administration),
University of Colorado; J.D. 1978, The National Law Center at George Washington
University. Mr. Means is a partner in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Crowell &
Moring.
See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1982).
2 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat.
1290 (1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1982)).
4 Codified at 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (1982). Section 105(c)(l) provides:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against or cause
to be discharged or cause discrimination against or otherwise interfere with
the exercise of the statutory rights of any miner, representative of miners
or applicant for employment in any coal or other mine subject to this Act
because such miner, representative of miners or applicant for employment
has filed or made a complaint under or related to this Act, including a
complaint notifying the operator or the operator's agent, or the represent-
ative of the miners at the coal or other miner of an alleged danger or
safety or health violation in a coal or other mine, or because such miner,
representative of miners or applicant for employment is the subject of
medical evaluations and potential transfer under a standard published
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sions.5 It broadly prohibits any interference with the exercise of
miners' rights under the Act. 6 It also prohibits discrimination
against any miner, applicant for employment, or representative
of miners based on his exercise of those rights. 7 It does not
prohibit discrimination against them in general, but only that
discrimination which is motivated by the exercise of those rights.'
Generally, the exercise of those rights is referred to as "protected
activity." 9 The Act charges the Secretary of Labor with enforc-
ing the Act's anti-discrimination provisions, which is done through
the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) and the
Office of the Solicitor of Labor (Solicitor).10
This area of mining law is among the most active and un-
settled. Because of the strong rights miners enjoy under the Act,
including the right to disobey direct work orders under certain
circumstances, and because these rights have been coupled with
an aggressive MSHA enforcement posture, this area of the law
has been highly controversial. As with much that is controversial
in our society, Mine Act discrimination law has spawned consid-
erable litigation. When the Bureau of National Affairs surveyed
the 1986 cases in which the decisions of the Federal Mine Safety
& Health Review Commission (Commission)" had been chal-
pursuant to section 101 or because such miner, representative of miners or
applicant for employment has instituted or caused to be instituted any
proceeding under or related to this Act or has testified or is about to
testify in any such proceeding, or because of the exercise by such miner,
representative of miners or applicant for employment on behalf of himself
or others of any statutory right afforded by this Act.






10 Mine Act § 105(c)(2)-(3), 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2)-(3) (1982).
" The Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission is an independent
agency of the United States Government created by Section 113 of the Mine Act to
adjudicate Mine Act disputes. 30 U.S.C. § 823(a) (1982). It consists of five commissioners
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate and it operates through a cadre
of administrative law judges, located in Falls Church, Virginia and Denver, Colorado,
who issue initial decisions which are subject to Commission review. Mine Act § 113(a)-
(e), 30 U.S.C. § 823(a)-(e) (1982). The Commission's rules of procedure are published
at 29 C.F.R. § 2700 (1982). Appeals from decisions of the Commission lie in the federal
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lenged and were pending in the United States Court of Appeals,
it found that 80 percent of those appellate cases were discrimi-
nation cases.1
2
This is a law being shaped more in the crucible of the
courtroom than in the committees of Congress. Since this largely
judge-made body of law is in such an evolutionary ferment, this
Article is intended to assist mineral law practitioners in two
ways: (1) by providing a summary overview of some of the
current provisions of that law,' 3 and (2) by highlighting the
current controversies and recent developments in those areas of
the law.
I. THE ANALYTIC SCHEME OF THE ACT
A case of discrimination under the Mine Act involves three
basic elements. First, there must be involved one or more indi-
viduals who are members of a protected class under the Act.'
4
Second, one or more individuals must have exercised some right
afforded by the Mine Act. 5 Third, as a result of that protected
activity, someone else must have engaged in a prohibited act.'
6
All three elements must be presented for a claim to lie under
section 105(c).
A. The Protected Class
The boundaries of the class of persons protected against
discrimination under the Act have been relatively stable since
section 105(c) was enacted in 1977. Three types of persons come
court of appeals for the circuit where the mine is located or in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Mine Act § 106(a)-(b), 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)-
(b) (1982).
2 Current Report, MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REP. (BNA) 456 (April 16, 1986).
'3 This article follows the organizational scheme of section 105.02 of Means,
Discrimination and Miners' Rights Under the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of
1977, KENTUCKY MINERAL LAW (1986) and discusses developments subsequent to those
addressed there. For the convenience of the reader, periodic cross-references to that
more comprehensive study are provided.
1' Means, supra note 13, at 43.
15 Id.
16 Id.
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within the protected class: miners, representatives of miners, and
applicants for employment. 7
The Act broadly defines "miner" to include any person
working in a coal or other mine. 18 This definition is coupled
with the even broader definition of "coal or other mine."'
19
When applying these inclusive definitions in accordance with the
congressional mandate that the Act be broadly construed, 20 it
becomes apparent that the Act's protection against discrimina-
tion is expansive. For example, in one case, a secretary in an
office on mine property was held to be a miner protected from
discrimination under the Mine Act. 21
In light of the Act's broad remedial purpose, the recent
decision in Paul v. PB-KBB,22 came as a surprise to many
observers. In Paul, which the United States Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit upheld, the Commission reversed an ad-
"7 Mine Act § 105(c)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (1982). See Means, supra note 13,
at 43-45.
Mine Act § 3(g), 30 U.S.C. § 802(g) (1982).
" Mine Act § 3(h)(l), 30 U.S.C. § 802(h)(1) (1982). "Coal or other mine" is
defined as:
(A) an area of land from which minerals are extracted in nonliquid form
or, if in liquid form, are extracted with workers underground, (B) private
ways and roads appurtenant to such area, and (C) lands, excavations,
underground passageways, shafts, slopes, tunnels and workings, structures,
facilities, equipment, machines, tools, or other property including im-
poundments, retention dams, and tailings ponds, on the surface or under-
ground, used in, or to be used in, or resulting from, the work of extracting
such minerals from their natural deposits in nonliquid form, or if in liquid
form, with workers underground, or used in, or to be used in, the milling
of such minerals, or the work of preparing coal or other minerals, and
includes custom coal preparation facilities. In making a determination of
what constitutes mineral milling for purposes of this Act, the Secretary
shall give due consideration to the convenience of administration resulting
from the delegation to one Assistant Secretary of all authority with respect
to the health and safety of miners employed at one physical establishment.
Id.
S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE &
ADMIN. NEws 3401, 3414 ("[I]t is the Committee's intention that what is considered to
be a mine and to be regulated under this Act be given the broadest possibly (sic)
interpretation.").
" Donovan v. Stafford Construction Co., 732 F.2d 954, 958 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
" Paul v. PB-KBB, Inc., 7 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1784 (1985), aff'd sub nor. Paul v.
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 812 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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ministrative law judge's (ALJ) decision that a mining engineer
designing a mine shaft was a "miner" under the Act. 23 The
engineer was discharged when he complained of violations of
MSHA's mandatory ventilation standards in a preliminary design
for an exploratory shaft.
24
In Paul, the Commission rejected the AL's ruling that the
Houston office where the complainant worked in designing the
shaft of a nuclear waste storage facility was a mine within the
literal meaning of the definition in the Act.2 The Commission
majority concluded that the ALJ had gone too far, ruling that
the Houston office during the period of the complainant's activ-
ity was not part of a "mine," and that the mine was merely a
design on a drawing board.26 Importantly, the Commission added
that, in its view, the complainant's work "in drafting a prelim-
inary engineering design for an experimental nuclear storage
facility clearly [was] not the type of activity that Congress in-
tended to be regulated by the Mine Act." ' 27 The Commission
stated that "the facilities and equipment of the subject engi-
neering firm designing a storage facility for nuclear waste [were]
not entities 'in use in connection with mining activities' and
summarized its holding simply: 'no mine, no miner, no Mine
Act coverage.' "28
A concurring Commissioner questioned the Paul majority's
opinion for assigning controlling weight to the fact that the
project at issue was only in a preliminary design stage with no
actual construction having yet been undertaken.29 Given the broad
remedial purpose of the Act, 0 the concurring Commissioner was
not willing to rule that a cause of action does not arise under
the Mine Act when a person alleges that he has voiced safety
concerns over the design of a structural facility to be used in
mining and has been retaliated against because of those safety
23 Id.
' Id. at 1786.
25 Id. at 1787.
26 Id. at 1787-88.
27 Id. at 1788.
Paul, 7 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1790.
29 Id.
" See notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
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concerns.3 1 Instead, the concurrence stated that the "inquiry [is]
not only into whether the operation performs one or more of
the . . . work activities [listed in the Mine Act's definition of
mine] but also into the nature of the operation performing such
activities." '3 2 The Commissioner explained that the operation in
question-the construction of an underground nuclear waste
storage facility for the federal government-compelled the con-
clusion that the facility was not yet, and never would be, a mine
within the meaning of the Mine Act.33
The court of appeals affirmed, ruling that neither the Hous-
ton office nor the prospective shaft which was being designed
were a "mine" and that, therefore, the complainant could not
be a "miner" or a "representative of miners" entitled to bring
an action under section 105(c).3 4 The court acknowledged that
the Act and its own precedents require that the term "mine" be
read expansively, but concluded that interpreting the Act to
cover the activities in question would "stretch[] the language of
the Act beyond its breaking point. ' 35 The court ruled that a
mine does not exist under the Act prior to the commencement
of mineral extraction or construction activities.3 6 Without decid-
ing whether the shaft, once constructed, would be a mine, the
court flatly ruled that:
Preliminary engineering and design activities are not covered
by the Mine Act .... Conceptual designs do not endanger
lives or property; any hazards they pose, prior at least to their
final approval or the initial stages of their implementation, are
purely hypothetical. The Act was not designed to regulate
ideas.37
Thus, as broad as the Mine Act's grant of jurisdiction may be,
the Paul case reaffirms that there remain some limits on that
" Paul, 7 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1791.
31 Id. at 1790 (emphasis added).
33 Id.
3" Paul v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 812 F.2d 717, 720
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jurisdiction. Not everyone can maintain a section 105(c) com-
plaint.
B. Protected Activities
The greatest ferment in the law of Mine Act discrimination
has been occurring in the realm of "protected activities." Under
the Mine Act, any interference with the exercise of any right
afforded to miners, representatives of miners, or job applicants,
including any adverse action taken against such an individual on
account of the exercise of such rights, constitutes unlawful dis-
crimination.3" The Act affords many types of well established
rights. The boundaries of those rights and the preconditions for
their invocation, however, remain unsettled in many respects. A
number of recent cases have wrestled with the proper location
of those boundaries and preconditions in several areas. Recent
developments are surveyed in the discussions which follow.
1. Walkaround
A miners' representative is entitled to accompany MSHA
inspectors during physical inspections of each mine for the pur-
pose of assisting in the enforcement of the Mine Act's mandatory
standards.3 9 If the representative is an employee of the mine
operator, the Act provides that the operator shall pay him his
regular compensation for time spent on walkaround activities/ °
As well established as this walkaround right has become, its
controversial nature continues to inspire considerable litigation.
a. Compensation for Post-Inspection Conferences
The Act clearly establishes the right of a miner representative
to participate in pre or post-inspection conferences held by the
MSHA inspector at the mine. 41 There has been uncertainty,
however, regarding whether the representative's right to com-
11 Mine Act § 105(c)(1), 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (1982). See supra note 4 for full
text of section.
" Mine Act § 103(f), 30 U.S.C. § 813(f) (1982). See Means, supra note 13, at 46-
47.
, Mine Act § 103(f), 30 U.S.C. § 813(f) (1982).
41 Id.
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pensation extended to such activities and, if so, to which types
of conferences. In Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Comm'n,"2 an ALJ agreed with the
union's position that Congress intended miners' representatives
be compensated for their time participating in pre and post-
inspection conferences, which are held at the mine immediately
or shortly after the completion of the inspection as part of the
walkaround process. 43 However, the mine operator's challenge
to MSHA citations was upheld. The citations were issued for
failure to compensate miners' representatives who attended post-
inspection conferences conducted pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 100.6(a)
of MSHA's civil penalty assessment regulations but who had not
accompanied the MSHA inspectors during the inspection." In
ruling that the miners' representatives were not entitled to com-
pensation for these activities under the Act's walkaround right,
the judge stressed that the conferences: (1) took place long after
the completion of the inspections and the abatement of the
violations; (2) were focused on the propriety of the inspectors'
findings made in conjunction with citations issued during the
inspection, which findings formed the basis for MSHA's civil
penalty assessment; and (3) were participated in by different
miners' representatives than those who accompanied the inspec-
tors.4"
On review, the Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision to
the extent that it upheld the right of miners' representatives to
be compensated for participating in pre and post-inspection con-
ferences. However, the Commission reversed the judge's ruling
that participation in the 30 C.F.R. § 100.6(a) post-inspection
conferences was not compensable." Although the discussions at
the conference related in part to the civil penalty assessment
function, the Commission also found that they related directly
to the enforcement of the Mine Act through the inspection
process and thus to safety and health issues, stating:
41 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 295 (1986), aff'd, Southern Ohio Coal Co. v. Federal Mine
Safety and Health Review Comm'n (6th Cir. 1987) (unpublished).
4I Id. at 297.
- Id. at 297-98.
41 Id. at 298-300.
- Id. at 299-300.
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The participation of the miner representative [sic] in the post-
inspection conferences and the resulting discussions of the
violations could assist inspectors in carrying out their enforce-
ment responsibilities and increased miner and operator aware-
ness of the conditions which resulted in the cited violations.
47
The delay between the inspections and the post-inspection con-
ferences and the fact that the participants in the conferences
were not the representatives who had accompanied the MSHA
inspectors did not "change the compensable character of the
conferences. ' '4 8 According to the Commission, the proper in-
quiry is whether the substance of the post-inspection conference
advanced the goals of enabling miners to understand the safety
and health requirements of the Act and enhanced miner safety
and health awareness, as well as apprised miners more fully of
the inspection results.
4 9
b. Special Accommodations for Walkaround Representatives
In Secretary of Labor on behalf of Richard Truex v. Con-
solidation Coal Co. ° a mine operator was held to have unlaw-
fully discriminated against a miners' representative by failing to
make special accommodations in his work assignments in order
to permit him to serve as the miners' representative at a meeting
with an MSHA inspector.5 ' The miner had been designated to
serve as the miners' representative at an upcoming post-inspec-
tion meeting. 2 The miner asked the operator to notify him when
the MSHA inspector arrived so that in the meantime he could
proceed to work underground with his regular crew until the
meeting, or to be given alternative work in an area that would
allow him to be readily available for the meeting." Since the
mine operator refused to accommodate the miner in either re-
spect, the Secretary filed a discrimination complaint citing the
operator for violating the miners' walkaround right.
5 4
41 Southern Ohio Coal Co., 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 295, 300.
" Id. at 300 n.2.
49 Id. at 300.
10 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1293 (1986).
5' Id.
11 Id. at 1295.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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The Commission held that the mine operator's refusal to
accede to the miners' representative's wishes "denied miners
their choice of representative at the conference."" In the Com-
mission's view, the mine operator discriminated against the miner
by preventing him from acting as a miners' representative with-
out having to declare himself first on union business and thus
to suffer a loss of pay as a result. The Commission based its
ruling on "Congressional recognition that an operator would be
required to make modifications in work assignments to permit
miner representatives to exercise section 103(f) rights . . . [and
that] reasonable work adjustments [were] required under section
103(f) to fully effectuate that section's participation rights." 5 6
Ironically, in another recent case, MSHA filed a discrimi-
nation complaint against a different mine operator for doing
what Truex said was discriminatory not to do.17 MSHA charged
that the operator's assignment of a walkaround representative
to alternative work in order to facilitate his walkaround duties
was an improper adverse action (because the miner preferred his
normal duties) taken against a miners' representative on account
of his walkaround rights." The case was settled before the
Commission had to resolve the tension between Truex and
MSHA's apparently inconsistent discrimination theory.5 9
c. Which Miners' Representatives Are Entitled to Walkaround
Rights?
Although the general principle is that the representative cho-
sen by the miners is entitled to walkaround with MSHA inspec-
tors, 60 several recent cases have arisen from mine operators'
contentions that this right is not unlimited. In Emery Mining
Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety and Health Admin. ,61
an ALJ held that the mine operator violated section 103(f) of
" Id. at 1298.
16 Consolidation Coal, 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1299.




61 Consolidation Coal, 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1298.
61 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1182 (1986).
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the Act in refusing to permit a non-employee international union
representative to accompany an MSHA inspector on a regular
underground coal mine inspection. The operator defended against
the MSHA citation by claiming: (1) that the Act did not require
that a non-employee miners' representative be given access to
the mine for walkaround purposes; 62 (2) that even if a non-
employee miners' representative otherwise had a right of access
the mine operator nonetheless had the right to exclude him when
he refused to comply with the reasonable precondition of signing
a waiver of liability which was required of all visitors to the
mine; 63 and (3) that, in any case, the non-employee representative
had not complied with MSHA regulations which require filing
with MSHA as a walkaround representative and that an em-
ployee miner representative had been permitted to walkaround
with the inspector. 64 The AL's decision rejecting each of the
mine operator's defenses is currently on appeal.
65
In the meantime, another ALJ concurred with the ruling that
miners' representatives are entitled to accompany MSHA inspec-
tors regardless of whether or not they are employed by the mine
operators, and went further still. 66 In Secretary of Labor on
behalf of Barry Mylan and Lester Poorman v. Benjamin Coal
Co. ,67 the ALJ held not only that the miners' representative need
not be employed by the mine operator, but also that he did not
have to represent the majority of miners at the mine.68
In Benjamin, the work force had recently voted in an NLRB-
conducted election against having United Mine Workers of
America (UMWA) representation. 69 Nevertheless, four out of the
more than 500 workers at the mine filed with MSHA designating
the UMWA as their walkaround representative. 70 When the non-
62 Id. at 1182-83, 1202-05.
61 Id. at 1182-83, 1205-07.
" Id. at 1207-08.
" Petition for review granted, in September, 1986 (unpaginated table, 8
F.M.S.H.R.C. Vol. 9).
1 Secretary of Labor on Behalf of Barry Mylan and Lester Poorman v. Benjamin




,0 Id. at 29-30.
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employee UMWA representatives attempted to accompany an
MSHA inspector on a mine inspection, they were ordered off
of the mine property by the operator."' They filed discrimination
charges with MSHA. 2 The ALJ upheld the complaint of dis-
crimination, assessed a civil penalty against the mine operator,
and ordered the operator to cease and desist from interfering
with the right of the UMWA officials to accompany MSHA
inspectors as walkaround representatives during mine inspec-
tions .73
The ALJ ruled that the concept of miners' representative
was different under the Mine Act than under the National Labor
Relations Act and that there was no requirement under the
former that a miners' representative represent all or even most
of the miners. 74 The judge did not address the potential impract-
icality and unworkability of his holding: if any two miners can
choose their own representative to walkaround with the MSHA
inspector, hundreds of walkaround representatives could claim
the right to accompany each MSHA inspector. It is hard to
imagine that Congress could have intended such a bizarre re-
sult.
75
2. Transfer to a Less Dusty Place
Miners who demonstrate evidence that they are suffering
from pneumoconiosis are entitled to transfer to a position in
some other, less dusty area of the mine. 76 In order to encourage
miners to exercise this right, Congress provided that miners
would suffer no loss in pay upon such a transfer. 77 Although
MSHA has implemented this right in detailed regulations pro-
mulgated under 30 C.F.R. Part 90,71 numerous unanswered ques-
"1 Id. at 30.
72 Benjamin, 9 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 32.
11 Id. at 53-54.
74 Id. at 51-52.
71 See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. § 813(e) (congressional intent to avoid unreasonable burden
on mine operators).
76 Mine Act § 203(b)(1)-(2), 30 U.S.C. § 843(b)(1)-(2) (1982). See Means, supra
note 13, at 48-49.
" Mine Act § 203(b)(3), 30 U.S.C. § 843(b)(3) (1982).
79 30 C.F.R. §§ 90.1-.220 (1986).
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tions continue to arise concerning the breadth and implications
of the transfer right. The Commission has not shown any great
interest in forging into the breach. In ruling that a miner who
had filed a request to be classifed as a "Part 90" miner but had
not yet been so classified was entitled to protection against
discrimination based on his prospective Part 90 status, the Com-
mission recently acknowledged: "[tihis case does not require us
to articulate the full extent of the protection afforded Part 90
miners by section 105(c) or to identify every form of discrimi-
nation that may arise in this context." 7 9
This troublesome uncertainty as to the scope of Part 90
rights is well illustrated by two conflicting 1986 ALJ decisions.
In Lady Jane Collieries, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, Mine Safety
and Health Admin. ,o MSHA cited a mine operator for violating
Part 90 by failing to maintain the prior pay levels of two Part
90 miners who were transferred to other jobs.8' The ALJ vacated
the MSHA citations because he found that the transfers were
the result of a legitimate, good faith reorganization and reduc-
tion in force, having nothing to do with the miners' exposure to
hazardous dust levels or any discrimination against them based
upon their Part 90 status. 2 In a well-reasoned opinion, the judge
held that the statute requires that a miner's pay be maintained
at pre-transfer levels only when the miner is transferred as a
result of his exposure to hazardous levels of dust.83 The judge
ruled that:
MSHA's argument that Part 90 recognizes no exceptions with
respect to the reasons for a miner's transfer IS REJECTED. I
find nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress
intended that an eligible Part 90 miner or potential transferee
be forever insulated from the economic realities of the mining
business. Nor do I find anything to suggest that a mine oper-
ator must forever guarantee a miner's wages in any subse-
quently acquired jobs which may come about as a result of
changed economic circumstances.
8 4
79 Goff v. Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co., 7 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1776, 1781 (1985).
8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 157 (1986).
It /d.
S2 Id. at 177, 178.
'3 Id. at 176-77.
Id. at 176.
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Before the year was out, another ALJ ruled to the contrary.
In Secretary of Labor on behalf of John W. Bushnell v. Can-
nelton Industries,85 MSHA charged an operator with discrimi-
nating against a Part 90 miner when the mine operator, due to
economic conditions, transferred the miner to a lower paying
job as a result of a realignment in the workforce. 86 This transfer
came four years after the Part 90 miner had been transferred to
a less dusty job. 7 Reading MSHA's regulations literally, without
consideration of the underlying policy issues, the judge held that
the operator discriminated when it reduced the rate of pay of
the Part 90 miner. 8 The judge did not articulate why a Part 90
miner should not remain subject to the non-discriminatory vicis-
situdes of the economy or the mining industry which govern the
destinies of his non-Part 90 colleagues, or otherwise provide an
explanation for his decision.
Thus, the Part 90 transfer provisions remain a fertile source
for disputes between mine operators, miners, and mine safety
regulators. It is obvious that there remain some fundamental
unsettled issues. The Commission must soon find an occasion
to address those issues in order to provide much needed guid-
ance.
3. Idlement Compensation
Section 111 of the Mine Act requires mine operators to
compensate miners idled because a mine or part of a mine is
closed by a withdrawal order issued under sections 103, 104, or
107.9 In addition to compensation for the period of idlement
including the balance of the shift and up to four hours of the
next shift, miners are also entitled to compensation for the entire
period of the idlement, up to a full week, if the idlement resulted
from a section 104 or 107 closure order issued for a mandatory
safety or health standard violation. 90




8 Mine Act § 111, 30 U.S.C. § 821. See Means, supra note 13, at 49-50.
90 Mine Act § 111, 30 U.S.C. § 821.
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Until recently, based on the decisions of each of the three
administrative law judges who had ruled on the issue, miners
were not entitled to the full week's compensation where MSHA
did not allege a violation of a mandatory safety and health
standard in the initial closure order itself.9' This was true re-
gardless of whether a violation may in fact have caused the
condition which led MSHA to issue the closure order.92 In three
decisions issued on September 26, 1986,93 the Commission re-
versed all three administrative law judges.
Reading the Act broadly in light of its remedial purposes,
the Commission ruled in the lead decision, Local Union 1889,
District 17 UMWA v. Westmoreland Coal Co.94 that the
form in which the violation of a mandatory standard is cited-
whether in a section 104(d) citation or order in a section 104(a)
citation-is not controlling for compensation purposes....
The essential question is one of causality, not procedural for-
mat: Was the [closure] order issued because of underlying
conditions involving a violation of mandatory standards? 95
Thus, if the answer to this question was affirmative, the claim
for compensation would be valid even if no mandatory standards
violations had been cited in the closure order nor, presumably,
cited anywhere. 96
The Commission also held in Westmoreland that a right to
idlement compensation would obtain even where the miners were
not in fact idled by an order issued under section 104 or section
107 of the Act, as provided in section 111. 97 The Commission
9, Local Union 1889, District 17, UMWA v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 6
F.M.S.H.R.C. 292 (1984) (Steffey ALJ), rev'd, 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1317 (1986); Local
Union 2274, District 28, UMWA v. Clinchfield Coal Co., 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1782 (1984)
(Moore ALJ), rev'd, 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1310 (1986); Local Union 1609, District 2, UMWA
v. Greenwich Collieries, 6 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2465 (1984) (Koutras ALJ), rev'd, 8
F.M.S.H.R.C. 1302 (1986).
92 See supra note 91.
91 Local Union 1889, District 17, UMWA v. Westmoreland Coal Co., 8
F.M.S.H.R.C. 1317 (1986); Local Union 2274, District 28, UMWA v. Clinchfield Coal
Co., 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1310 (1986); Local Union 1609 District 2, UMWA v. Greenwich
Collieries, 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1302 (1986).
9, 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1317 (1986).
9, Id. at 1329-30 (emphasis in original).
% Id.
" Id.
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noted that they had already been idled by an order issued under
section 103 of the Act at the time when the section 104 or 107
order was ultimately issued.9"
A different kind of idlement compensation question was
raised in Local Union No. 5817, District 17, UMWA v. Monu-
ment Mining Corp. and Island Creek Coal Co., 99 where the
focus was not on the preconditions for liability under section
111, but rather on who may be liable for that compensation
obligation.100 A mine owner had entered into a management
contract with an independent contractor under which the con-
tractor had complete control and management of the mine. The
miners were also employees of the contractor.' 0' Because of the
contractor's alleged violation of MSHA blasting regulations, a
withdrawal order was issued to the contractor under section
104(d) of the Act, idling the miners for several days. 0 2 The
contractor subsequently went out of business. In the face of the
contractor's default in the miners' compensation claim litigation,
an ALJ allowed the miners to amend their complaint to name
the mine owner as a respondent. 03 The judge's subsequent de-
cision awarding the miners compensation only against the con-
Id. The Commission stated:
We find nothing in the statute or in its legislative history to suggest that
an existing section 103 order precludes the issuance of a valid and effective
section 107(a) order either for purposes of mine safety or compensation
entitlement under the third sentence of section 111. We therefore conclude
that the chronological sequence in which the section 103 and 107(a) orders
were issued is not determinative of the miners' right to compensation under
the third sentence of section 111. In light of the graduated compensation
scheme of section 111, imputation of preclusive effect to the initial section
103 control order would effectively frustrate the obvious intent of Congress
to provide for expanded one-week compensation beyond the more limited
shift compensation available under the first two sentences of the section.
Stated otherwise, we believe that Congress did not intend section 103
control orders, usually issued first in time under exigent circumstances, to
have compensation-precluding effects. The focus, as stated above, is upon
the conduct of the operator and the conditions in the mines, not the
sequencing of MSHA enforcement activity.
Westmoreland Coal, 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1326-27.
99 9 F.M.S.H.R.C. 209 (1987), appeal docketed No. 87-1136 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 209-10.
101 Id. at 210.
101 Id. at 211.
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tractor, and not against the mine owner, was upheld by the
Commission. 04
Rejecting the union's claim that liability should be joint and
several between mine owner and independent contractor, the
Commission ruled that the "plain meaning of section 11 1 of the
Mine Act, as well as the Act's overall purpose, established that
the 'operator' responsible for the conditions or violations un-
derlying the section 111 claim is the sole operator responsible
for compensating the idled miners."'' 5 Acknowledging that the
mine owner, as well as the independent contractor operator could
be cited for the violation itself under the Mine Act, the Com-
mission ruled nonetheless, that compensation determinations must
focus upon the conduct of the operator responsible for the
conditions at the mine. °6 The Commission also noted that the
Act's remedial purposes are best effectuated if the operator
responsible for the violation is also held responsible for any
compensation claim from its employees arising from such vio-
lations. 107
As the foregoing cases suggest, idlement compensation law
is still in its infancy. Recent activity indicates that this will be
one of the most fertile areas for labor-management conflict in
the Mine Act arena in coming years.
4. Refusals to Work
A miner has the right to refuse to work in the face of unusual
hazards.'10 The dimensions of this right are nowhere spelled out
in the Act, the legislative history, or MSHA's regulations, leav-
ing their complete development to case-by-case adjudication.'0 9
Although the courts and the Commission have imposed certain
preconditions on the exercise of this right, 110 its generally amor-
O Id.
015 Monument Mining, 9 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 211-13.
o Id. at 211-12.
'o Id. at 212.
101 See, e.g., Miller v. Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission, 687
F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Means, supra note 13, at 50-51.
" Biddle, Means, & Levine, Protected Work Refusals Under Section 105(c)(1) of
the Mine Safety and Health Act, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 629 (1987).
110 In sum, the miner must have a good faith, reasonable belief that a hazardous
condition exists and must ordinarily communicate that belief to a representative of the
operator. See Biddle, Means, & Levine, supra note 109.
JOURNAL OF MINERAL LAW AND POLICY
phous nature continues to spawn considerable litigation. There
have, however, been no recent significant changes in this aspect
of the law. In fact, the Commission recently reversed the decision
of an ALJ who sought to liberalize the threshold requirements
that must be satisfied before a work refusal will be protected
under the Mine Act; the Commission expressly reaffirmed those
prerequisites for a protected work refusal under section 105(c).
I1
There has been considerable recent decisional activity con-
cerning the boundaries of the Act's protected activities and the
preconditions for their exercise. Much remains unsettled in this
area, and a continued case-by-case development should be ex-
pected.
C. Prohibited Acts
It is unlawful discrimination under the Mine Act for any
person to interfere with a miner's exercise of his rights under
the Mine Act or to discipline, suspend, discharge, or take any
other adverse action against a miner because of a protected
activity." 2 This element of discrimination remains a sine qua
non of a successful section 105(c) cause of action under the Mine
Act."'3 Although the Commission has gone so far as to recognize
that the adverse action may be a constructive one, not necessarily
a formal and overt action," 4 it has declined to go further and
allow a successful claim of constructive discharge without a
showing of discriminatory motive."'
In Simpson v. Kenta Energy, Inc., 6 the Commission re-
versed an ALJ ruling that a miner had been constructively dis-
charged in violation of the Mine Act. ' 7 The miner had quit his
job in the face of admittedly hazardous and unlawful working
Simpson v. Kenta Energy, Inc., 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1034 (1986), rev'g 7
F.M.S.H.R.C. 1454 (1984) (D.C. Cir. 1986) (appeal docketed No. 86-1441) (Broderick
ALJ).
12 Mine Act § 105(c)(1), U.S.C. § 815(c)(1) (1982). For full text of this section, see
supra note 4. See also Means, supra note 13, at 52.
'' See, e.g., Smith v. Reco, Inc., 9 F.M.S.H.R.C. 992, 994 (1987).
Rosalie Edwards v. Aaron Mining, 5 F.M.S.H.R.C. 2035 (1983).
Simpson v. Kenta Energy, Inc., 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. 1034 (1986) (D.C. Cir. 1986)
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conditions. There was, however, no evidence that the operator
was motivated either to create or to maintain those working
conditions because of the miner's exercise of any rights protected
by the Mine Act." 8 Although the Commission recognized the
existence of case law under Title VIIP' 9 not requiring proof of
retaliatory motive, it refused to incorporate that concept into
the Mine Act because "section 105(c) of the Mine Act essentially
is an anti-retaliation provision" and requires proof of a retal-
iatory motive before a constructive discharge will be found.
120
Although the miner had the right to complain about the unsafe
conditions and was under no obligation to continue working,
his quitting was not a constructive discharge in violation of the
Act because the adverse conditions were not maintained in order
to retaliate against the miner for protected activity.
12'
Despite the ferment and rapid development of so many as-
pects of miners' rights and discrimination law, it is apparent
that the requirement of a prohibited act remains firm. The
Commission is not willing to dispense with that prerequisite to
a cause of action. No matter how unfair the operator may have
been, he will not be deemed to have discriminated under the
Mine Act unless he was unfair in retaliation for protected activ-
ity.
D. Complaint, Investigation, and Adjudication Procedures
Miners who believe that they have been discriminated against
because of their protected activities may file a complaint with
MSHA. 122 If MSHA then concludes that the complaint lacks
merit, the miner may proceed to file and prosecute his own
discrimination case before the Commission. 23 In order to assure
that the complaint is handled expeditiously, the Act requires
MSHA to first investigate the complaint and imposes certain
Id. at 1038, 1040-41.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
Simpson, 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 1040.
2 Id. at 1038, 1040-41.
"= 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2).
123 Mine Act § 105(c)(2)-(3), 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2)-(3) (1982). See Means, supra
note 13, at 53-54.
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time frames for MSHA's administrative action.2'4 The Commis-
sion has recently held, however, that these time frames are not
jurisdictional. 2 5 Therefore, even if MSHA fails to conclude its
investigation of a miner's complaint within the time required by
the Act, it may subsequently file a delayed complaint without
adverse consequence to the complainant, absent a showing of
prejudice to the respondent.
26
In Secretary of Labor on behalf of Donald R. Hale v. Four-
A Coal Co.,127 the Secretary's delay of over two years in filing
a discrimination complaint with the Commission was not itself
sufficient to justify dismissal.12 The Commission recognized that
the Secretary had violated the Act's time constraints imposed on
processing the miner's complaint, and that Congress intended
the Secretary to follow these requirements and proceed expedi-
tiously. 129 Yet, the Commission also found that the legislative
history was explicit that the miner should not suffer for the
Secretary's derelictions. 30 Accordingly, the Commission held that
if the Secretary's complaint is "late-filed, it is subject to dis-
missal [but only] if the operator demonstrates material legal
prejudice attributable to the delay."''
CONCLUSION
Miners' rights and discrimination law under the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act of 1977 continues to develop at a rapid
pace. Cases under section 105(c) of the Act continue to flood
the Commission and constitute an inordinately large share of its
"I The Secretary is required to commence his investigation within 15 days of the
receipt of a complaint of discrimination; to notify the miner of his determination whether
§ 105(c) has been violated within 90 days; and to immediately file with the Commission
a complaint of discrimination if he finds that there has been a violation. Mine Act §
105(c)(2)-(3), 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2)-(3) (1982).
- Secretary of Labor on behalf of Donald R. Hale v. Four-A Coal Co., 8
F.M.S.H.R.C. 905 .(1986).
- Id. at 907-08.
127 Id. at 905.
1 Id. at 907.
129 Id. at 907-08.
Id. at 908 (citing S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1977)).
' Four-A Coal, 8 F.M.S.H.R.C. at 908.
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docket. As a service to the practitioner who must keep abreast
of such developments, this Article has reviewed some of the
most recent developments in this area of the law. The volume
of litigation in this relatively virgin specialty area of labor law,
however, should put the reader on notice not to stop here. In
this field of law, today's recent development is tomorrow's prior
case law, and one must vigilantly watch for new developments.

